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Non-Technical Summary 
International comparisons of business locations emphasise the importance of taxation. 
This kind of research is focussed upon the tax burden on capital investment. However, 
since qualified workers become increasingly mobile internationally, companies should 
also pay attention to the tax burden imposed on the production factor labour at the 
firm’s location – an issue so far largely neglected by research. The present paper aims 
at filling this gap by analysing the tax burden on highly skilled labour from the per-
spective of the company. We take into account all direct taxes and social security con-
tributions inasmuch as they qualify as taxes from an economic point of view. Our ap-
proach allows for old-age provision as part of the compensation package, taking ac-
count of the resulting benefits and tax liabilities in an explicit inter-temporal model. 
We apply the model to the tax and social security systems of France, Germany, the 
UK, and the USA, and discuss the results. 
We measure the employer’s expenses for a highly qualified employee under the as-
sumption that the highly qualified has to obtain an internationally comparable dispos-
able income after taxes. We consider income taxes including surcharges, tax-like so-
cial security contributions as well as payroll taxes paid by the company. The em-
ployee’s income is assessed for tax and social security purposes in several periods dur-
ing the life cycle. Using this method, we derive effective average tax rates for several 
income levels, structures of compensation, and family situations which are typical for 
highly qualified employees. 
The results show that there are considerable differences in tax burden across the coun-
tries studied. The USA and the UK most of the time have lower tax burdens than Ger-
many and France. Considering families, Germany moves up to the second rank for low 
incomes. The effective average tax rate increases with increasing income despite in-
come ceilings for social security, as all tax systems considered have progressive tax 
schedules.  
The main tax drivers for the tax burden on highly skilled labour are the tax rate of the 
personal income tax and income ceilings and contribution rates to social security. Es-
pecially with lower incomes the employee’s family situation is important for the tax 
burden. The composition of the compensation package has a minor influence on the 
tax burden if one compares old-age provision with a hypothetical investment yielding 
tax free interest. If such interest income is taxed at the top marginal rate of the per-
sonal income tax, however, the effective average tax rate can be reduced substantially 
by increasing the share of occupational pension plans in the compensation package. 
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Abstract 
A model is presented for simulating the tax burden on highly skilled manpower. The effective 
average tax rate, defined as the relative wedge between total remuneration and disposable 
income, is computed. Income and payroll taxes and social security contributions not yielding 
an equivalent benefit are taken into account. The compensation package consists of cash 
payments and old-age provision. To integrate retirement benefits and their tax treatment, an 
inter-temporal approach is used. The results indicate that Germany and France have higher tax 
burdens than the UK and the USA, that Germany grants the strongest tax relief for families, 
and that occupational pension plans are favourable in all countries. 
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1. Introduction 
International comparisons of business locations emphasise the importance of taxation. 
For example, the European Commission has funded several comparative studies on the 
effective tax burden of companies in the European Union (see European Commission 
1992, 2002). This kind of research is focussed upon the tax burden on capital invest-
ment. However, since qualified workers become increasingly mobile internationally, 
companies should also pay attention to the tax burden imposed on the production fac-
tor labour at the firm’s location – an issue so far largely neglected by research. The 
present paper aims at filling this gap by analysing the tax burden on highly skilled la-
bour. In line with received measures of capital taxation, we use the effective average 
tax rate as a measure for the relative additional amount that has to be paid by the com-
pany if it wants to remunerate a highly qualified employee with a predetermined dis-
posable income. 
Our approach is characterised by four distinctive features. Firstly, we treat the tax bur-
den on highly skilled employees from the perspective of the company. Secondly, we 
take into account all direct taxes and social security contributions inasmuch as they 
qualify as taxes from an economic point of view. Thirdly, our approach allows for old-
age provision as part of the compensation package, taking account of the resulting 
benefits and tax liabilities in an explicit inter-temporal model. Fourthly, the final pur-
pose of our research being international comparisons, we apply the model to the tax 
and social security systems of four countries and discuss the results. 
Tax burden on qualified labour as an issue for the firm. 
To see why the tax burden on labour should be a concern for companies, observe that 
highly qualified specialists or managerial staff are typically mobile across jurisdic-
tional boundaries.1 Such an employee will evaluate different employment opportuni-
ties on the basis of the disposable income he receives after taxes. Our international 
comparison is thus based on the assumption that the employee obtains a fixed dispos-
able income which he can earn at all locations. This however implies that the tax to be 
paid on an employee’s income is shifted onto the company. Thus, taxes and social se-
curity contributions payable by the employee increase labour costs as perceived by the 
firm. Adding labour related charges paid by the employer results in the total remunera-
tion which the company has to spend so as to be able to hire the employee. Dividing 
the difference between total remuneration and disposable income, the tax wedge, by 
the total remuneration, one obtains the effective average tax rate (EATR) which is the 
measure for the tax burden on highly skilled manpower we propose. 
The higher the EATR, the more the employer has to spend in order to compensate an 
internationally mobile employee. Or, to express it from the perspective of regional 
                                              
1 According to Winkelmann et al. (2001: 33), 38.9 per cent of all companies in Germany employ uni-
versity graduates originating from foreign countries. In the UK, the corresponding share is even 49.6 
per cent. The industries most inclined to employ internationally mobile highly skilled staff are re-
search and development, information technology, and chemicals (Winkelmann et al. 2001: 34). See 
also Winkelmann (2002). 
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politics, the higher the EATR, the less attractive is a country for companies employing 
highly qualified employees. When assessing the attractiveness of regions for highly 
skilled labour in this way, it should be stressed that we do not intend to provide a com-
prehensive theory of migration. More modestly, our methodology aims at isolating the 
tax burden as one important factor for the attractiveness of locations. Thus, we do not 
question the importance of other factors influencing a job decision, such as job satis-
faction, cost of living, local schools, or environmental amenities. However, in order to 
clearly display international differences in taxation, we purposefully abstract from 
these factors. 
Taxes and tax-like social security contributions. 
The tax wedge is composed of all direct taxes and charges paid by employer or em-
ployee in connection with the total remuneration. This obviously includes income 
taxes and surcharges, as well as payroll taxes levied on aggregate salaries or wages. 
Concerning contributions to the various branches of social security, our leading princi-
ple is to consider such payments as tax-like charges if they do not yield a specific 
benefit to the individual employee. We assume that such a benefit is provided by con-
tributions to public health care systems, whereas contributions to insurances against 
unemployment and employment-related injuries qualify as taxes. 
Since mandatory public pension schemes differ widely among countries regarding 
both contributions and benefits it would neither be satisfactory simply to add these 
contributions to the tax burden nor simply to ignore them. Instead, we carefully ac-
count for the benefits provided by such schemes according to the regulations currently 
in force in each country. By using this approach, we take account of the fact that pay-
ments into a public pension scheme can at least partially be considered as insurance 
premium even if the benefit provided is typically not actuarially fair. 
We do not include indirect taxes in our measure of the tax burden on labour. At first 
glance, this may not seem satisfactory since in general equilibrium, the value added 
tax is equivalent to a tax on wages, pure profits, and existing wealth (see for example 
Gravelle (1991), Metcalf (1996), and Gaube and Schwager (2003)). The present 
model, however, is a partial equilibrium approach aiming at isolating the taxes trig-
gered directly by the employment decision. Since higher indirect taxes primarily show 
up in higher prices, leaving consumption taxes out of the simulation is in line with dis-
regarding the cost of living and other location factors. 
Compensation package and inter-temporal approach. 
Our aim is to quantify the tax burden on the income generated by working during one 
period. However, the compensation of highly qualified employees typically does not 
only consist of income which is paid out in the remuneration period. In particular, con-
tributions to old-age provision – both publicly mandated and voluntary – provide bene-
fits only after retirement. This form of compensation triggers tax liabilities in different 
periods. For this reason, a satisfactory assessment of the effective tax burden on em-
ployees earning mixed compensation packages has to account for the inter-temporal 
structure of income, tax and social security payments. Thus we adapt our concept to 
account for disposable incomes generated in the remuneration period but accruing in 
different periods. In such an inter-temporal setting the EATR is defined as the differ-
ence between total remuneration and the sum of appropriately discounted disposable 
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incomes generated by working in the remuneration period. To sum up, the effective 
average tax rate EATR supplies information about current and future tax payments and 
charges that occur in context with the total remuneration earned in one period. 
International comparison. 
In the present paper, the model is applied to France, Germany, the UK, and the USA. 
In this comparison we vary the level of disposable income from € 40,000 to € 200,000. 
Moreover, we consider both a single person and a family of four. The results indicate 
that throughout all income levels, effective tax burdens in France and Germany exceed 
those of the UK and the USA. On the other hand, Germany grants the highest tax relief 
for families among these four countries, whereas in the UK there is almost no such 
relief at the top end of the income scale. These applications mainly serve as an illustra-
tion of the working of the model since the focus of the present paper is on the method 
and not on results. Readers interested primarily in results are referred to the companion 
study Elschner and Schwager (2004a) which covers a much wider geographical area 
and provides many more variations of the model details. 
Outline of the paper. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we take up the 
defining characteristics of our approach and relate them to other concepts of effective 
tax burdens, both on capital and on labour. Section 3 describes the formal model. In 
section 4 we present the results of the international comparison. Finally, section 5 puts 
the results in perspective and discusses some future lines of research. An appendix 
contains summary tables of the tax and social security regulations used as well as some 
more detailed results. 
2. Other Concepts of Effective Tax Rates 
Measures of company tax burdens. 
The basic structure of our concept of an EATR is borrowed from acknowledged meth-
ods of measuring the tax burden of companies such as the effective marginal tax rate 
introduced by King and Fullerton (1984), the effective average tax rate proposed by 
Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003), or the effective tax burden computed with the 
European Tax Analyzer simulation model (see Jacobs and Spengel, 1996). In all these 
concepts, a wedge between a pre-tax value and an after tax value is divided by the pre-
tax value so as to obtain an effective rate of taxation. The concepts by King and Fuller-
ton and Devereux and Griffith only assess the tax burden on an additional unit of in-
vestment. Contrary to that, we assess the tax on the total income of the individual 
rather than the tax on a marginal increase of his working time. In that respect our con-
cept is closer to the European Tax Analyzer model which quantifies the tax burden of 
an entire company. In another respect, i.e., regarding the treatment of the employee’s 
disposable income as exogenous, our approach has its counterpart in the measure of 
effective marginal tax rates by King and Fullerton. When calculating effective mar-
ginal tax burdens on investment, one can either fix the post tax return to the investor 
(the so called fixed-r-case) or the cost of capital which the investment earns (the so-
called fixed-p-case). Since we fix the post tax income, our approach corresponds to the 
fixed-r-case, whereas a computation of disposable incomes for exogenous total remu-
neration resembles rather the fixed-p-case.  
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Measures of labour tax burdens. 
The tax burden on labour has been quantified by several alternative approaches. In 
analogy to backward looking measures on the taxation of capital income, Mendoza et 
al. (1994) present effective average tax rates on labour income. These measures are 
computed by dividing aggregate taxes on labour income by a macroeconomic measure 
of such income. The advantage of these measures is that they are based on observed 
data, using actual tax payments. However, this also implies that they cannot provide 
any information about the effect of specific tax rules on the tax burden. Moreover, by 
its macroeconomic nature, one cannot determine the tax burden for different economic 
situations such as income levels or marital status. Backward looking measures are 
therefore not a suitable guide for the impact of taxation on economic decisions. Their 
main application lies in providing a quick reference figure for the way taxation inter-
feres with the distribution of incomes among the factors of production on a macroeco-
nomic level. 
The EUROMOD research consortium takes a microeconomic approach (see Suther-
land, 2001). In this model, the tax and social security contributions as well as welfare 
entitlements are simulated for a representative sample of the population. While this 
simulation is similar to the casuistic tax assessment performed in our model, pension 
entitlements are taken from the data instead of being simulated using the legal regula-
tions, thus introducing a backward looking element in EUROMOD (see Sutherland, 
2001: 5). The results of the individual tax assessments are then aggregated into society 
wide indicators, for example a Gini coefficient, so as to answer a variety of policy 
questions. Thus, the focus of microsimulation models is not to provide effective tax 
rates for specific categories of employees but on a microfoundation of aggregate pol-
icy analysis. Here, distributional issues are evidently at the centre of interest.  
In its publication series on “taxing wages” described by Heady (2003), the OECD 
takes an approach which is similar to ours in several respects (see OECD, 2002). Also 
there, the taxes and social security contributions of several types of workers are as-
sessed in a casuistic simulation. An effective average tax rate is then calculated by di-
viding the resulting tax wedge by total labour costs. As in our approach, income and 
payroll taxes are considered. However, there are two major differences between our 
model and the OECD approach. Firstly, unlike the OECD we do not treat social secu-
rity contributions as a whole as taxes. Instead, we take care to relate as precisely as 
possible individual benefits procured by contributions to public pension schemes to the 
payment of these contributions. Secondly, both approaches consider different types of 
employees. While the OECD concentrates on the average production worker and 
workers earning 67 or 167 per cent of this worker, our study is explicitly focussed on 
highly qualified employees. Beyond a mere change in the income level this has two 
structural consequences which make our model substantially richer than the OECD 
approach. Firstly, we take care to analyse the specific tax treatment of various com-
pensation components. Secondly, since old-age provision is prominent in the compen-
sation package of highly qualified employees this necessitates an inter-temporal ap-
proach. 
Several recent studies quantify the intensity of redistribution induced by public pen-
sion systems using a simulation approach that is related to ours. For example, Börsch-
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Supan and Reil-Held (2001) estimate the share of transfers, as opposed to insurance 
benefits, included in payments from the German pay-as-you-go pension system. Using 
data from the Socio-Economic Panel, a sample of German households, they simulate 
the pension entitlements of each household by applying the legal pension formula to 
an estimated earnings history. Fenge and Werding (2003) quantify the tax rates which 
are implicit in the pay-as-you-go pension systems of selected OECD countries. Simi-
larly to the method proposed in the present paper, this work is also based on an inter-
temporal simulation model describing the earnings and pension entitlements of a rep-
resentative individual. Since these studies exclusively focus on pensions they are able 
to include more details, in particular concerning life-expectancy and demographics. On 
the other hand, our approach is much broader in scope since we incorporate all taxes 
and social security contributions which are related to employing the highly qualified 
person. 
To sum up, our model differs from all existing methods by addressing the issue of the 
tax burden on manpower from the point of view of the company, and by its careful 
modelling of the tax burden induced at different times by different kinds of compensa-
tion. 
3. The Model 
In the present section the method is described in detail. We first define the concept of 
the effective average tax rate and explain the basic model structure. This consists of 
the inter-temporal setting, the characteristics of the highly skilled, and definitions of 
taxes and charges. After that, the relationship between total remuneration, taxes, and 
disposable income is described formally. 
The effective average tax rate. 
The two key economic variables in the model are the total remuneration  E*  and the 
disposable income  E.  Total remuneration is the amount the company has to pay in 
order to obtain the labour supply by the highly skilled employee for one year. Dispos-
able income is the amount the employee obtains in exchange for this labour supply. 
The difference  E*-E,  called the tax wedge, is taken by government. Dividing the tax 
wedge by total remuneration we obtain the effective average tax rate 
 *
*
E
EEEATR −=  (1) 
This is the measure of effective tax burden proposed in this paper. 
Inter-temporal structure. 
The  EATR  is to be understood as the tax burden imposed on the earnings of one year. 
However, some parts of the employee’s earnings are only available to him in later pe-
riods. Specifically, pension schemes procure a benefit only after retirement although 
the contributions clearly are part of the compensation received for working. For that 
reason, we consider an explicit inter-temporal structure with the employee’s working 
life covering periods  t = 0,1, … t0 , …, tp-1,  and the retirement phase extending over 
periods,  t = tp, tp+1, …, tp+P-1.  Two periods are of specific interest: By working dur-
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ing the year  t0  the employee earns the remuneration the tax burden of which is to be 
evaluated. This period is called the remuneration period, and the disposable income 
received by the employee in this period is denoted by  E0.  The second period of inter-
est is the first period of the retirement phase,  tp.  As explained in detail at the end of 
this section we transform the benefit procured by pension schemes into an annuity dur-
ing the entire retirement phase. Thus, the remuneration earned by working in  t0  gen-
erates a constant flow of disposable incomes  Ep  in  tp  and each of the subsequent  P-1  
years of retirement. To evaluate this flow, a constant interest rate  r   is assumed, with 
the discount factor denoted by  1/(1 )rδ = + .  The interest rate  r   is the individual rate 
of return the employee obtains for his savings, possibly net of income taxes levied on 
interest income.  
The disposable income  E  is then obtained by computing the present value of this flow 
at time  t0  plus the disposable income  E0  in the remuneration period: 
 0
0
1
0 0
1
(1 ) 1
p
p
p
t P P
t tp
pt t
t t
E
E E E E
r
δδ δ
+ −
−
−
=
⎛ ⎞−= + = + ⋅ ⋅⎜ ⎟+ −⎝ ⎠∑  (2) 
Our analysis aims at deriving the total remuneration necessary to provide the skilled 
employee with a given disposable income which he could earn at another location. 
Thus, our simulation has to find a value of  E*  which, given the tax and social security 
regulations in force in the country under consideration, leads to the exogenously fixed  
E  according to equation (2). In practice, however, taxes and social security contribu-
tions are imposed according to quantities which are related to total remuneration rather 
than disposable income. For that reason,  E*  is computed by an iterative procedure. 
Starting from an arbitrary value of total remuneration tax and social security liabilities 
are assessed yielding some disposable income. If this value exceeds (falls short of) the 
disposable income assumed to be required by the employee, the assessment is repeated 
for a lower (higher) total remuneration. This loop is carried out until the required dis-
posable income is achieved. 
Taxes and social security charges. 
The core of the simulation model is thus the determination of disposable income  E0  
and  Ep  from tax and social security regulations when total remuneration  E*  is given. 
The computation of EATR takes into account income taxes and surcharges, payroll 
taxes paid by the company, and those contributions to social security systems which do 
not yield an equivalent individual benefit to the employee.2 We assume this to be the 
case for unemployment insurance premiums, since competition for the mobile em-
ployee rules out unemployment, and for accident insurance, since we do not think of 
high risk manual work. Contrary to that, we abstract from redistributive elements in 
health care systems and do not consider those premiums to be tax-like. Inasmuch as 
contributions to the first pillar of old-age insurance have to be seen as a tax-like 
charge, this charge appears in the form of a lower pension compared to a pension pos-
sible under market conditions. 
                                              
2 See tables A-1 to A-4 in the appendix for a description of the tax and social security regulations 
taken into account in the simulations. 
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Tax and social security legislation usually does not refer to the economic concepts of 
total remuneration and disposable income. Instead, the assessment base is a legally 
defined quantity called taxable or gross income. Since the bases of taxes and social 
security contributions differ in most cases we denote taxable income by  et  and gross 
income for social security purposes by  eg.  The tax schedule  T(et, x)  determines the 
income tax due after deduction of any tax credit. In addition to taxable income, it may 
depend on a vector of personal characteristics, denoted by  x,  such as family status.  
Regarding social security we distinguish between contributions to the first pillar of 
old-age insurance according to the schedule  Ω(eg)  and other contributions according 
to the schedule  Γ(eg).  We denote by  Γτ (eg)  those contributions, contained in  Γ(eg),  
which in our evaluation are considered as tax-like without an equivalent benefit. Usu-
ally, both employer and employee pay contributions to the systems of social security. 
We designate contributions applying to the employer with a hat (^) and those applying 
to the employee with a bar ( ¯ ). Thus we have  ˆ( ) ( ) ( )g g ge e eΩ = Ω +Ω   and  
ˆ( ) ( ) ( )g g ge e eΓ = Γ +Γ   for all  eg.  Finally, payroll taxes depend on gross income, and 
are denoted by  ( )geΘ . The social security schedules in practice typically are piece-
wise linear functions where several marginal rates are applied to the various income 
brackets. In particular, there may exist income ceilings such that the amount of contri-
butions to be paid remains constant as soon as gross income reaches the ceiling. All 
schedules, including payroll taxes, however, are continuous and have first derivatives 
of at least zero and below one. Moreover, contributions are zero if gross income is 
zero and the average social security payment  [Ω(eg) + Γ(eg)]/eg  is bounded away from 
one. 
The typical highly skilled employee. 
The model employee in our analysis represents a typical highly qualified employee. 
He is defined by three main characteristics: the income level, the composition of com-
pensation components, and as a personal characteristics the marital status and the 
number of children. Since we deal with skilled employees, the income level is rather 
high, varying between disposable incomes of € 40,000 and € 200,000. Concerning the 
family situation, we consider both a single employee and a family of four where the 
highly skilled employee is the only earner. 
The compensation package considered consists of cash compensation and old-age pro-
vision. The shares of these two compensation components in total remuneration are 
fixed3 and denoted by  fc  for cash and  fp  for old-age provision, with  fc + fp = 1.  The 
compensation component old-age provision is itself composed of two parts. Firstly, 
there are contributions to occupational pension plans, denoted by  C.  These are paid 
by both employee and employer, with the shares of  C  contributed by the employee 
and the employer being  β  and  (1 - β)  respectively. Secondly, compulsory contribu-
tions to the first pillar of public old-age insurance  Ω(eg)  naturally are part of old-age 
provision yielding 
                                              
3 For the numerical values used for  fc  and  fp  as well as other parameters in the simulations, see table 
A-5 in the appendix. 
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 * ( )gpf E C e= +Ω . (3) 
Notice that the percentage  fp  of total remuneration spent for old-age contributions is 
fixed by assumption. Also, the country-specific amount of contributions to the first 
pillar of the old-age insurance is fixed by law. As a consequence the free variable in 
equation (3) is the amount of contributions to the occupational pension scheme. These 
contributions therefore depend on  fp  and on the country-specific public pension 
scheme. 
Since the shares  fc  and  fp  of both compensation components refer to total remunera-
tion, social security contributions and payroll taxes have to be assigned to one of the 
two compensation components. While contributions to the first pillar of old-age insur-
ance are part of old-age provision according to (3) we assume that all other contribu-
tions count towards the compensation component cash. Denoting by  I  the cash pay-
ment that actually flows to the employee after deduction of social security contribu-
tions, cash compensation is then equal to 
 * ( ) ( )g gcf E I e e= +Γ +Θ . (4) 
Gross income in the remuneration period. 
In the remainder of this section, we describe how disposable income is derived given 
the assumptions on the compensation package and social security charges. We begin 
with the remuneration period. For that period, it has to be explained how the unknown 
variables  eg  and  et  are derived from total remuneration  E*. 
The employer’s contributions to social insurance  ˆ ( )geΩ   and  ˆ ( )geΓ   as well as payroll 
taxes  ( )geΘ   usually are not part of gross income. However, in some countries contri-
butions to occupational pension plans are part of gross income and thus liable to social 
insurance. Denoting therefore by  zˆ   ( z )  the fraction of the employer’s (employee’s) 
contributions to occupational pension plans which are part of gross income according 
to social security regulations the latter can be obtained as  
 [ ]* ˆˆˆ(1 )(1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )g g g ge E z z C e e eβ β= − − − + − −Γ −Ω −Θ . (5) 
Alternatively, gross income can also be obtained by adding to the cash income  I  the 
employee’s contributions to social insurance, as well as the part of employer’s and 
employee’s contributions to occupational pension plans which are subject to social 
security: 
 ˆ[ (1 )] ( ) ( )g g ge I z z C e eβ β= + + − +Γ +Ω . (6) 
Solving equation (3) for  C,  inserting in (5), and rearranging yields4 
 * ˆˆ ˆ( ) [ (1 ) ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ (1 ) ]g g g g gc pe e E f z z f e e e z zβ β β β⎡ ⎤−Ω = + + − −Γ −Θ −Ω + −⎣ ⎦ . (7) 
                                              
4 The same result can be obtained by using (6) instead of (5) when  I  is eliminated with the help of (4). 
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From  '( ) 1geΩ <   and  ˆ ˆ'( ), '( ), '( ) 0g g ge e eΩ Γ Θ ≥ ,  in this equation, the left hand side is 
strictly increasing and the right hand side is weakly decreasing in  eg.  Moreover, when  
eg  = 0  the left-hand-side is zero while the right-hand side is positive. Finally, as gross 
income grows without bound, the left hand side approaches infinity since average con-
tributions are bounded below one. Thus there exists a unique solution  eg  to (7). This 
solution is the gross income for social security purposes which corresponds to total 
remuneration  E*. 
As an illustration, consider linear schedules for all social security contributions, no 
payroll taxes, and assume that the employer’s (employee’s) contributions to occupa-
tional pension plans are not (are fully) part of gross income, that is  ( )g ge eωΩ = ,  
ˆ ˆ( )g ge eωΩ = ,  ( )g ge eγΓ = ,  ˆ ˆ( )g ge eγΓ = ,  ( ) 0geΘ = ,  and  ˆ 0z = , 1z = .  Then (7) can be 
solved explicitly for gross income yielding 
 
( )*
ˆ1
c pg
E f f
e
β
γ ω βω
+= + − +  (8) 
The taxable income  et  is the difference between the gross income  eg  and the deduc-
tions  d0  available to a taxpayer who receives work income. For example, such deduc-
tions may be granted for business-related expenses, contributions to social security 
including the pension system, children, and personal allowances. Thus,  
 0t ge e d= − . (9) 
On this taxable income, the tax schedule is applied, where personal characteristics take 
the values  x0  applying in period  t0,  yielding the tax payment  T(et, x0). 
The disposable income in the remuneration period 
As the cash component is the only income that initiates direct payments to the em-
ployee, the disposable income of period  t0  is the difference of cash compensation less 
taxes and tax-like social security charges other than for compulsory public pensions: 
 *0 0( , ) ( ) ( )t g gcE f E T e x e eτ= − −Θ −Γ . (10) 
The pension period. 
Following our inter-temporal setting, the benefits procured by old-age provision only 
accrue in the retirement phase. In order to derive the annual disposable income  Ep  
during this phase, one has to quantify not only the resulting pension annuities but also 
the tax levied upon pension income during retirement. Moreover, pension payments 
received are the result of contributions during the entire working phase and hence are 
not directly attributable to contributions paid in period  t0.  Therefore, the pensions 
procured by working in the remuneration period have to be isolated from other old-age 
income and then be subject to tax so as to arrive at  Ep. 
A simple way to determine the period-specific disposable income  Ep  would be to cal-
culate the pension payments that result from old-age contributions linked to  E*  and 
assess them to taxation, ignoring other income during retirement. However, as the 
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schedules of personal income taxes are progressive, this procedure would result in too 
small tax payments, and  Ep  would appear too high. Therefore, we determine  Ep  in 
two steps. In the first step, the tax rate applying to this employee’s total pension in-
come is derived. In the second step, the pension resulting from contributions during 
period  t0  is determined. Subtracting from this pension taxes according to the tax rate 
derived in the first step then yields disposable income  Ep. 
In order to obtain the tax rate, the annual pension income that results from the contri-
butions during the entire working life has to be computed and then assessed to per-
sonal income tax according to tax regulations. This pension consists of annual pay-
ments  Π%   received from the first pillar of old-age insurance, and an annuity  A%   re-
ceived from occupational pension plans. For both kinds of pensions, we assume con-
stant contributions during working life amounting respectively to  Ω  and  C  per year.  
The public pension  Π%   is calculated according to the country-specific pension formu-
lae currently in force which often depend on the number of years during which the 
employee has worked and paid into social insurance. The occupational pension  A%   is 
calculated as an investment under market conditions. The invested contributions result 
in a capital stock at the end of working life. The capital is then distributed over all  P  
years of retirement as an annuity which is the annual pension  A% .  Formally,  A%   is 
obtained from equating the value of contributions and of pension claims at the begin-
ning of the retirement phase: 
 
1 1
0
ˆ(1 )
ˆ(1 )
p p
p
p
p
t t P
t t
t t
t t t
AC r
r
− + −
−
−
= =
+ = +∑ ∑
%
  (11) 
The left-hand-side of equation (11) is the capital stock accumulated by the occupa-
tional pension plan during the working years  t = 0,1,…,tp-1,  valued at the beginning 
of retirement in period  tp.  The right-hand-side of (11) is the present value at time  tp  
of a stream of annuities  A%   received by the retired employee throughout the retirement 
phase, that is in periods  t = tp, tp+1, …, tp+P-1.  In (11) the interest rate  rˆ   relevant for 
the company’s payment into the occupational pension scheme is used, taking account 
of the tax treatment of these payments on the company level. 
Adding both annuities and subtracting deductions  dp  applying to the retired em-
ployee, for example due to a favourable treatment of income from public pensions, one 
arrives at the taxable income in each year of retirement. Denoting personal characteris-
tics in the retirement phase by  xp  the tax payment  ( ),p pT A d xΠ + −%%   results. Dividing 
this by the pension income gives the average tax rate 
 
( ),p p
p
T A d x
A
τ Π + −= Π +
%%
%%   (12) 
during each year of retirement. 
In the second step, the pension is calculated that would result exclusively from the 
contributions paid out of the total remuneration relating to period  t0.  For occupational 
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pensions, this implies that contributions  C  are invested in period  t0  and the resulting 
capital stock at time  tp  is then distributed as annuities  A  over all years of retirement. 
That is,  A  is determined by 
 0
1
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ˆ(1 )
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p
p
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t t
t t
t t
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=
+ = +∑  (13) 
For the public pension, we assume that € 1 of contributions increases the pension by 
the same amount, no matter when it was paid. Together with the assumption of a con-
stant stream of contributions, and noting that the working phase  t = 0,1,…,tp-1  is of 
length  tp,  this implies that the public pension linked to total remuneration  E*  is equal 
to 
 
pt
ΠΠ = %  (14) 
In order to obtain the disposable income  Ep  of one period during retirement, the sum 
of both kinds of annual pensions according to (13) and (14) has to be reduced by taxes 
according to the tax rate given in (12). We so arrive at  
 ( ) ( )1p pE Aτ= − ⋅ Π + . (15) 
Thus, with equations (10) and (15), all elements for computing the EATR according to 
(1) and (2) are in place. 
The effect of interest rates. 
When calculating the disposable income during retirement, at two instances, interest 
rates are important. Firstly, the firm may face a different interest rate after taxes than 
the employee. This will arise, for example, when the employee has to pay tax on inter-
est income while the firm can accumulate tax-free, since investments into pension 
funds are tax-deductible. If this is the case, it is more advantageous to save inside the 
company in the form of an occupational pension scheme rather than to save on the 
household level. Secondly, the formula used to calculate the public pension will ex-
hibit an internal rate of return which typically differs, and most of the time falls short 
of the market interest rate. Thus, contributions to the first pillar of old-age insurance 
usually are dominated by private savings. The loss of return compared to the market 
interest rate is equivalent to a tax implicit in the obligation to pay into compulsory 
pay-as-you-go pension systems. 
4. International comparison 
The following analysis shows the effective average tax rates on highly qualified man-
power in Germany, France, the UK, and the USA (Massachusetts). In all simulations, 
we refer to legislation in force in 2003. We measure the tax burden that occurs under 
varying conditions in context with the employee’s characteristics (income level, com-
pensation package, and family situation) and in context other variables (interest rate 
before and after taxes, exchange rates). In the analysis, we consider all personal in-
 12
come taxes, surcharges (in Germany), as well as payroll taxes (in France). We define 
as charges the contributions to insurances against unemployment and work-related 
injury, and the charges in France concerning apprentices, advancement of employment 
and housing, as well as the social tax. In the UK, where a social security system with 
overall contributions applies, we assume that one fifth of all contributions up to the 
employee’s income ceilings and all exceeding contributions are comparable to a 
charge.5  
Results for a single employee. 
In the standard case, we analyse a single employee without children. His total remu-
neration consists of 80 per cent cash compensation and 20 per cent old-age provision. 
Employer and employee contribute equal shares to the second pillar of old-age insur-
ance. Considering first the benchmark case of a disposable income after taxes and 
charges of € 100,000, we obtain effective average tax rates of 39.0 per cent in the 
USA, 40.9 per cent in the UK, 48.9. per cent in Germany, and 49.0 per cent in France. 
In other words, employers in France have to incur expenses of € 196,078 to compen-
sate their highly skilled employees with a disposable income of € 100,000. Employers 
in the USA only have to pay € 163,934 to grant the same disposable income. With in-
creasing income, EATRs are increasing as well (see table B-1). Figure 4-1 shows the 
effective tax burden when the disposable income increases from € 40,000 to 
€ 200,000. In Germany, the EATR increases by 4.8 percentage points. In the USA, 
France, and the UK, the EATRs increase by 10.0, 12.9, and 13.5 percentage points, 
respectively.  
These results reflect top statutory income tax rates and the size of income brackets in 
which lower tax rates apply. In addition, EATRs are determined by contribution rates 
and income ceilings of social insurance. We discuss the tax schedules first. In Ger-
many, the highest tax rate of 51.2 per cent6 applies for incomes of more than € 50,000. 
In France, the top tax rate of 49.58 per cent applies to income exceeding € 47,000. In 
the UK and the USA, the top tax rates are at least five percentage points below the 
German and French rates: They amount to 40 per cent and 43.9 per cent7 respectively. 
These rates are achieved with incomes of ₤ 29,900 and $ 311,950 respectively. Thus, 
the high EATR in Germany and France is clearly a consequence of the high statutory 
tax rate. On the other hand, in the USA, the incomes considered do not yet fall in the 
highest bracket. For example, the highest tax rate applicable to a taxable income of 
$ 130,000 is 30 per cent. Hence, the EATR in the standard case with a disposable in-
come of € 100,000 is substantially below the top tax rate. 
If, in Germany, taxable income exceeds € 50,000 the highest tax rate is applied to the 
entire taxable income, with the resulting tax liability being reduced only by a tax de-
duction of € 9,000. In the other countries analysed, the tax schedule assigns different 
tax rates to each income bracket. While this is formally equivalent to a proportional 
schedule combined with a tax deduction, as in the German case, the resulting tax relief 
is much larger in the three other countries. Therefore, the progressiveness of the per-
                                              
5 See tables A-1 to A-5 in the appendix for more details. 
6 Including surcharge of 5.5 per cent of top income tax rate of 48.5 per cent in 2003. 
7 Combined tax rate of Federal Income Tax and personal income tax of the state of Massachusetts. 
 13
sonal income tax is more pronounced in these countries than in Germany, despite the 
fact that in the UK and in France the top tax rate is achieved with comparable levels of 
income. 
Figure 4-1: Effective average tax rate with varying disposable incomes of a single 
(2003) 
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Source: ZEW 
The contribution rates to the social insurance systems considered as charges in our 
simulation vary substantially, between 3.3 per cent in the UK and around 18 per cent 
including social tax in France. In France tax-like social security contributions have 
thus a remarkable influence on the tax burden, which is however mitigated somewhat 
by generous deductions for social security contributions and work related expenses. In 
the USA and in Germany, all contributions are limited by moderate income ceilings. In 
France, to the contrary, contributions and social tax of 13 per cent have to be paid on 
the entire income. In the UK, the employer’s contributions are payable on total in-
come. In the two latter countries, the proportion of charges relative to income stays 
therefore constant whereas in Germany and in the USA, the importance of social secu-
rity and tax-like charges decreases with increasing income. This, together with the in-
come tax schedule, explains the moderate rise in EATRs in Germany as opposed to the 
fairly steep increase in the other three countries. 
Family taxation. 
Families receive several tax allowances in all countries. One kind of tax relief for 
families consists of allowances for married couples, usually in the form of joint filing 
and special tax schedules. The other kind of relief is granted in the form of tax allow-
ances or transfer payments for dependent children. A common way of taxing couples 
is to divide their joint income by a “family quotient” and determining the average 
statutory tax rate applicable to a single who earns this reduced income. This tax rate is 
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then applied to the couple’s joint income. Given increasing average tax rates, for a 
couple with differing incomes, this procedure results in lower tax payments compared 
to a single earning the joint income of both spouses. In Germany, the quotient is 2, 
irrespective of the number of children. In France, the quotient is 3 for a family of 
four,8 but the advantage procured by this quotient compared to a quotient of 2 is lim-
ited to € 4,100. The USA does not apply a family quotient but subjects married cou-
ples to a special tax schedule instead. In the highest income bracket, however, this 
special schedule provides for the same tax rate as the schedule for singles. The UK 
does not grant joint filing, i.e., each spouse is subject to tax with her or his individual 
income. 
Transfer payments for two children amount to € 2,600 in France, € 3,700 in Germany, 
and ₤ 1,300 in the UK. In addition, children are taken into account for the calculation 
of the tax payment in France in the form of a higher family quotient as explained, and 
in the form of a child tax credit for lower incomes in the UK. In Germany, families can 
deduct € 11,600 from taxable income if this form of child allowance is preferable to 
the transfer payment. The USA grants personal deductions of $ 3,050 for each family 
member and a child tax credit of up to $ 600 for low earnings. 
Considering the tax regulations one observes that Germany seems to be the country 
favouring families most. This impression is confirmed by our simulations. With re-
spect to the EATRs of families, the ranking of the countries analysed changes com-
pared to the case of singles (see tables B-2 and B-3). In Germany, the employer has to 
spend much less for a highly qualified employee with a family than for a single if he 
wants to grant a disposable income of € 40,000. With an EATR of 20 per cent, Ger-
many in this case has the second lowest tax burden behind the USA with 19.6 per cent. 
In the UK, the EATR is 24.8 per cent and in France, it is 29.3 per cent. For higher in-
comes, the ranking changes again. For income levels of € 200,000 we observe the 
same ranking as for singles. 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the family advantage by displaying the ratio of the EATR of a 
family over the EATR of a single with the same disposable income. In Germany, this 
ratio is lowest, i.e., the family advantage is highest. The ratio is 44.1 per cent for a 
family receiving a disposable income of € 40,000. The family advantage decreases for 
higher incomes up to a ratio of 89.6 per cent for a disposable income of € 200,000. The 
USA also favour families to a relatively high extent for lower incomes, and at a level 
comparable to France for higher incomes. In the UK, the family advantage resulting 
from child allowances decreases rapidly with increasing income leaving virtually no 
family benefit at an income of € 200,000. The reason why we find such a high family 
advantage in Germany is the high level of child allowances respectively child credits 
and the unlimited advantage of joint filing for married couples. 
                                              
8 For each spouse, 1 is added to the quotient, and for each dependent child, the quotient is raised by 
0.5. 
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Figure 4-2: Family advantage: a family’s EATR divided by a single’s EATR 
(2003) 
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The effect of exchange rates. 
The cost of living does not differ substantially in the countries analysed. Because of 
this, we transfer the disposable income expressed in € to $ respectively ₤ by average 
nominal exchange rates (see table A-5). Taking into account different costs of living, 
another possibility to convert the disposable income is using purchasing power parities 
like those published by the OECD. The purchasing power parities (PPP) are measured 
as the amount of local currency necessary to buy the same basket of goods which costs 
$ 1 in the USA. France has a PPP of 0.912, Germany 0.981 and UK 0.638 in 2003. If 
one converts the disposable income using the purchasing power parities of the OECD 
the EATRs only change to a small extent (see table B-4). The tax burdens increase by 
0.1 percentage points in the UK and 0.5 percentage points in the USA.  
Taxation of old-age provision. 
The composition of the compensation package also influences the effective average 
tax rates. In principle, deferring compensation to the retirement phase may be favour-
able or detrimental because of two kinds of effects: The interest effect arises because 
personal income taxes on interest income drive a wedge between the interest rates be-
fore and after taxes. Schedule effects stem from the schedules of income taxes and so-
cial security. A progressive tax schedule implies a lower average tax rate if compensa-
tion is transferred into a period (typically the pension period) in which the total income 
is lower. Furthermore, the compensation package may influence the base used to com-
pute the contributions to social security. However, it turned out that schedule effects 
are less important in our simulations than the interest effect because of the high level 
of income analysed. 
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To illustrate the working of the interest effect we simulate two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, we assume that the employee’s interest rate after taxes  r   equals the interest 
rate relevant for the company  rˆ   and also the market interest rate. This means that 
interest income derived from a hypothetical alternative investment is tax free. Com-
pared to this investment the taxation of contributions into old-age provision is neutral 
if either contributions are fully deductible and pensions are taxed, or conversely, con-
tributions are not deductible and pensions are tax free. In the second scenario, we con-
sider the other extreme where the interest income derived from the alternative invest-
ment is subject to the top marginal income tax rate whereas the return on investment 
by the company remains tax free. That is, in this scenario, we have  rr ˆ<   and  rˆ   
equals the market interest rate. In this case, a neutral taxation of pensions is achieved if 
contributions are not deductible and only the income element, that is the interest im-
plicit in the pension payment, is subject to taxation. 
Turning to the case  rr ˆ=   first, we compute the EATR for different compositions of 
the compensation package for the disposable income of € 100,000. For that purpose, 
we vary the share of old-age provision, which is composed of contributions to the first 
and the second pillar of old-age insurance, from 15 to 45 per cent. Notice that we have 
to assume a certain minimum amount of old-age provision because contributions to the 
first pillar are compulsory. 
Table 4-1: The effective tax burden with variation of old-age provision in the case  
rr ˆ= , single, disposable income € 100,000, in % 
Proportion old-age provi-
sion 
France Germany UK USA 
15% 48.0 49.0 40.2 38.2 
20% 49.0 48.9 40.9 39.0 
25% 49.9 48.9 42.0 39.9 
30% 50.9 48.9 43.0 40.9 
35% 52.0 48.9 44.0 41.9 
40% 53.2 48.9 45.1 43.0 
45% 54.3 48.9 46.1 44.0 
Source: ZEW 
As is apparent from table 4-1, increasing the part of old-age provision in the compen-
sation package produces diverging effects on the EATR in the four countries. The ef-
fective tax burden nearly stays constant in Germany. In the German case we assume 
that occupational pensions are granted in the form of a direct guarantee. This implies 
that contributions to the second pillar by both employer and employee9 are tax exempt 
during investment and that pensions are taxable income during retirement.10 Thus, in 
                                              
9 In the case of a direct guarantee, the employee’s contribution consists of foregoing cash compensa-
tion in exchange for the pension claim.  
10 For an analysis of the taxation of different forms of old-age provision in Germany, see Brassat and 
Kiesewetter (2003). 
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Germany the tax system treats occupational pensions like a hypothetical investment 
whose interest is tax free. 
In France, the tax burden increases by 6.3 percentage points when the proportion of 
old-age provision increases from 15 to 45 per cent. The employee’s and employer’s 
contributions to the voluntary second pillar usually are subject to tax. Consequently, a 
neutral taxation in the first scenario would imply that all resulting pensions are tax-
exempt. However, in France these pensions are taxable with a standardised income 
element of 40 per cent. Thus, there is a discriminating interest effect. 
In the UK, contributions to occupational pension plans are deductible up to 15 per cent 
of gross income with an annual ceiling of ₤ 97,200. Exceeding contributions are not 
deductible. Resulting pensions always are subject to tax, even if the contributions have 
been paid out of taxed income. Thus, with an increasing proportion of old-age provi-
sion the effective tax rate increases by 5.9 percentage points, because an increasing 
proportion of old-age provision is double-taxed.  
In the USA, contributions paid by the employer are tax exempt and the resulting pen-
sions are taxable during retirement. Contrary to that, contributions paid by the em-
ployee are not deductible in the remuneration period, but the resulting pensions are 
still taxable with their income element. Compared to the hypothetical tax-free invest-
ment, this results in a non-neutral taxation of old-age provision which explains why 
the EATR increases by 5.8 percentage points. 
Table 4-2: The effective tax burden with variation of old-age provision in the case  
rr ˆ< , single, disposable income € 100,000, in % 
Proportion old-age provi-
sion 
France Germany UK USA 
15% 41.6 41.0 35.1 29.8 
20% 37.5 37.7 32.7 27.2 
25% 31.9 34.4 30.5 24.6 
30% 26.3 31.1 28.3 22.1 
35% 20.7 27.8 26.2 19.7 
40% 15.1 24.6 24.0 17.4 
45% 9.5 21.3 21.8 15.2 
Source: ZEW 
In the second scenario with  rr ˆ< ,  the company’s interest rate remains the market rate 
of return, whereas the employee’s net interest rate  r   is calculated from the market 
interest rate by taking into account the country-specific top marginal tax rate including 
surcharges and state taxes. In this case, it pays off in all countries to defer compensa-
tion into the future by old-age provision, as shown in table 4-2. The tax burdens fall 
with increasing old-age provision by 13.3 percentage points in the UK, 14.6 percent-
age points in the USA, 19.7 percentage points in Germany, and 32.1 percentage points 
in France.  
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In this case, contributions are invested at a higher interest rate than the interest rate 
with which the resulting pension payments are evaluated. Consequently, if contribu-
tions are not deductible, a neutral taxation would require subjecting the income ele-
ment to tax. If contributions are deductible, a neutral taxation of old-age provision is 
possible only if the entire pension is taxed at a rate which exceeds the tax rate during 
the remuneration period. As the preceding discussion shows, in all the countries ana-
lysed the taxation of old-age provision is favourable compared to this neutrality 
benchmark. This is most evident in the case of France. Here, a certain schedule effect 
arises because high old-age provision reduces the base for contributions to the compul-
sory pension system. Furthermore the high marginal tax rate increases the wedge be-
tween the gross and the net interest rate thereby enhancing the interest effect. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aims at quantifying the effective average tax rate (EATR) of highly skilled 
employees from an employer’s point of view. We measure the employer’s expenses 
for a highly qualified employee under the assumption that the highly qualified has to 
obtain an internationally comparable disposable income after taxes. We consider in-
come taxes including surcharges, tax-like social security contributions as well as pay-
roll taxes paid by the company. The employee’s income is assessed for tax and social 
security purposes in several periods during the life cycle. Using this method, we derive 
EATRs for several income levels, structures of compensation, and family situations 
which are typical for highly qualified employees. 
The results show that there are considerable differences in tax burden across the coun-
tries studied. The USA and the UK most of the time have lower tax burdens than Ger-
many and France. Considering families, Germany moves up to the second rank. The 
EATR increases with increasing income despite income ceilings for social security, as 
all tax systems considered have progressive tax schedules.  
The main tax drivers for the tax burden on highly skilled labour are the tax rate of the 
personal income tax and income ceilings and contribution rates to social security. Es-
pecially with lower incomes the employee’s family situation is important for the tax 
burden. The composition of the compensation package has a minor influence on the 
tax burden if one compares old-age provision with a hypothetical investment yielding 
tax free interest. If such interest income is taxed at the top marginal rate of the per-
sonal income tax, however, the EATR can be reduced substantially by increasing the 
share of occupational pension plans in the compensation package. 
Our analysis suggests two main lines for future research. Firstly, the model can be ex-
tended and applied in several ways. Obviously, from a policy perspective, a larger geo-
graphical scope than the four countries analysed would be informative. Also, more 
variation of the family situation and the compensation package will provide deeper 
understanding of the working of tax and social security regulations.11 While the cur-
                                              
11 See Elschner and Schwager (2004a) and Elschner and Schwager (2004b) for an extension to nine 
countries and the inclusion of other compensation components such as stock option plans. 
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rent paper provides an international comparison, it does not deal with genuinely inter-
national transactions. Therefore, a major structural extension will consist of integrating 
the taxation of expatriate staff into the model. A different issue which in principle 
could be modelled with our approach is the taxation of employees who change resi-
dence when they retire. 
Secondly, the results of our simulation model can serve as an input into empirical re-
search projects which aim at testing the impact of taxes on other economic variables. 
For example, our simulation results may be used to assess empirically the impact of 
the taxation of highly qualified employees on regional growth rates or on migration 
flows.  
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Appendix 
A Tax and Social Security Regulations 
Table A-1: Social insurance 
Germany 
1st pillar old-age insurance - contribution rate: 9.75 % (each, employee and employer) 
- income ceiling: € 62,100 
Health insurance - contribution rate: about 7 % (each, employee and employer) 
plus care insurance 
- income ceiling: € 41,400  
- liable for contributions with income up to € 45,900 
Unemployment insurance - contribution rate: 3.25 % (each, employee and employer) 
- income ceiling: € 62,100 
Work injury insurance - contribution rate: about 1.42 % (employer) 
- income ceiling: € 61,356 
France 
1st pillar old-age insurance - contribution rate employee: 6.55 % up to income of € 29,184
contribution rate employer: 8.2 % up to income of € 29,184 
- contribution rate employee: 0.1 % without income ceiling 
contribution rate employer: 1.6 % without income ceiling 
Health insurance - contribution rates: 0.75 % (employee), 12.8 % (employer) 
- no income ceiling 
Unemployment insurance - contribution rate: 2.1 % (employee), 4 % (employer) 
- income ceiling: € 29,184 
Work injury insurance - contribution rate: about 2.26 % (employer) 
Other charges - charges concerning apprentices, advancement of employ-
ment, housing: contribution rate 5.4 % (employer) 
- social tax (Contribution sociale généralisée CSG and Contri-
bution au remboursement de la dette sociale CRDS): contri-
bution rate 8 % on 95 % of gross income (employee) 
UK 
Global insurance/overall 
contributions 
- contribution rate employee: 8.4 % on income up to ₤ 30,420 
- contribution rate employer: 8.3 % starting on income above 
₤ 4.615 without income ceiling (contracted-out) 
USA 
1st pillar old-age insurance - contribution rate 6.2 % (each, employer and employee) 
- income ceiling: $ 87,000 
Health insurance - contribution rate 1.45 % (each, employer and employee) 
- no income ceiling 
Unemployment insurance - contribution rate: 6.2 % (employer) 
- income ceiling: $ 7,000 
Work injury insurance - contribution rate: variable, average in 1995 at 2.05 % 
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Tax System: 
Table A-2: Kinds of taxes analysed 
Germany - personal income tax 
- surcharge (Solidaritätszuschlag) 5.5 % of personal income tax 
France - personal income tax 
- lump sum tax (taxe professionnelle) 
UK - personal income tax 
USA - federal income tax 
- state income tax 
 
Table A-3: Personal income tax: allowances and schedules 
Deductions and tax credits 
Germany deductions 
- social insurance: max. € 2,001 
- personal (within the tax schedule): € 7,235 
- work: € 1,044 
France deductions 
- social insurance: full deductibility  
- personal (within the tax schedule): € 4,191 
- basic deduction: 10 % of income after deduction of social security 
contributions, min. € 370, max. € 12,437 
- supplementary deduction: 20 % of the first € 113,900 
UK deductions 
- social insurance: no deductibility 
tax credits 
- personal: ₤ 4,615 
- old-aged persons: ₤ 4,615 - ₤ 6,100 depending on income 
USA deductions 
- social insurance: max. $ 2,000 (state) 
- standard deduction: $ 4,750 (federal), alternatively itemized deduction 
- personal: $ 3,300 (state) 
- old-aged persons: $ 700 (state) 
Tax schedules 
Germany  
Single  
 taxable income in € tax formula 
 up to 7,235 0 
 7,236 - 9,251 (768.85 · y + 1,990) · y 
  y = 1/10,000 · (taxable income – 7,200) 
 9,252 - 55,007 (278.65 · z + 2,300) · z + 432 
  z = 1/10,000 · (taxable income – 9,216) 
 from 55,008 on 0.485 · x – 9,872 
  x = taxable income 
Married couples quotient: 2 
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France 
Single  
 income bracket in € tax rate in % 
 up to 4,191 0 
 4,191 – 8,242 7.05 
 8,242 – 14,506 19.74 
 14,506 – 23,489 29.14 
 23,489 – 38,218 38.54 
 38,218 – 47,131 43.94 
 above 47,131 49.58 
Family quotient: 3 up to an advantage of € 4,102, then family quotient of 2 
UK 
Single  
 income bracket in ₤ tax rate in % 
 up to 1,920 10 
 1,920 – 29,900 22 
 above 29,900 40 
Individual tax assessment 
USA 
Single  
 income bracket in $ tax rate in % 
 up to 6,000 10 
 6,000 – 28,400 15 
 28,400 – 68,800 27 
 68,800 – 143,500 30 
 143,500 – 311,950 35 
 above 311,950 38.6 
Married couples  
 income bracket in $ tax rate in % 
 up to 12,000 10 
 12,000 – 47,450 15 
 47,450 – 114,650 27 
 114,650 – 174,700 30 
 174,700 – 311,950 35 
 above 311,950 38.6 
State of Massachusetts: 5.3 % (proportional tax schedule) 
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Table A-4: Old-age provisions: first and second pillar of old-age insurance and 
tax regulations 
First pillar 
Contributions see above 
Pension formula for a monthly public pension after 40 years of contributions 
Germany pension points • current pension value  
pension points: 1.8 per year of contributions. pension value in 2003: 26.13 
France reference income • individual pension factor • number of insurance quarters 
reference income: average of earnings. pension factor: 0.5 for a person retir-
ing at the age of 65 
UK currently ₤ 290  
USA average income • discount factor 
discount factor for the first $ 593: 90 %, for the next $ 2,975: 32 %, exceed-
ing parts: 15 % 
Taxation of contributions: see above 
Taxation of public pensions 
Germany income element taxable (27 % for a person retiring at the age of 65) 
France fully taxable 
UK fully taxable 
USA fully taxable with incomes above $ 43,000 
Second pillar 
Type of occupational old-age provision 
Germany Direct guarantee. Employee’s contributions are deferred compensation. 
France Compulsory contributions to Agirc and Arrco between 7.5 and 20 % of de-
fined income brackets; financed as PAYG-systems; pension formula: sum-
marised pension points · pension value, pension point is the annual contribu-
tion divided by a reference income. 
Non-compulsory contributions are invested in additional pension schemes. 
UK Pension Plan (defined-contribution). Resulting annual pension payment 
must not exceed the maximum benefit of two thirds of the final remunera-
tion to be tax-privileged. 
USA Pension Plan. Contributions must not exceed 25 % of the employee’s earn-
ings or $ 35,000 per year.  
Taxation of contributions 
Germany Employer’s contributions are tax exempt. Employee’s contributions are tax 
exempt as the employee does not obtain a legal claim to a future pension. 
France Employer’s and employee’s contributions are tax-exempt/tax-deductible up 
to a limit of 19 % of 8 times the income ceiling of social insurance. 
UK Employer’s contributions are tax exempt. Employee’s contributions are tax 
exempt up to 15 % of gross income with an annual maximum of ₤ 97,200.  
USA Employer’s contributions are tax exempt. Employee’s contributions are sub-
ject to tax. 
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Taxation of pensions 
Germany Pension payments out of direct guarantees are fully taxable. A tax allowance 
of 40 % of the pension, maximum € 3,072, can be claimed. 
France Pensions out of compulsory system are subject to tax. Annuities resulting 
from non-compulsory pension plans are taxable with their income element 
of 40 %. 
UK Pensions are fully taxable. 
USA Pensions resulting from the employer’s contributions are fully taxable. Pen-
sions resulting from the employee’s contributions are taxable with their in-
come element: The employee’s total contributions to the occupational pen-
sion plan are divided by the total number of expected monthly annuities. 
The ratio divided by the number of annuities is the monthly tax exempt 
amount of occupational pension. 
 
Table A-5: Exogenous variables 
r market interest rate 5 per cent 
exchange rates average nominal exchange rates in 2003 
$ to €: 1.1294; ₤ to €: 0.6915 
PPP Purchasing Power Parities 
 $ to € (average of France and Germany): 1.0565; ₤ to € (average 
of France and Germany): 0.6741 
number of years in work 40 
number of years during retirement 20 
fc fraction cash compensation 80 per cent in the standard case 
fp fraction old-age provision 20 per cent in the standard case 
B Results in Detail 
Table B-1: The effective tax burden with variation of disposable income, single, in 
% 
Disposable income in € France Germany UK USA 
40,000 40.7 45.3 30.4 33.1 
60,000 45.6 47.4 36.4 37.1 
80,000 48.3 48.4 39.3 38.0 
100,000 49.0 48.9 40.9 39.0 
120,000 50.5 49.3 42.0 40.2 
140,000 51.7 49.6 42.7 41.2 
160,000 52.5 49.8 43.2 41.8 
180,000 53.1 50.0 43.6 42.4 
200,000 53.6 50.1 43.9 43.1 
Source: ZEW 
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Table B-2: The effective tax burden with variation of disposable income, family, 
in % 
Disposable income in € France Germany UK USA 
40,000 29.3 20.0 24.8 19.6 
60,000 33.6 31.0 33.4 26.6 
80,000 37.0 33.3 37.3 30.1 
100,000 40.3 36.8 39.4 32.8 
120,000 42.4 39.7 40.7 34.3 
140,000 45.1 41.7 41.6 36.0 
160,000 47.1 43.0 42.3 37.5 
180,000 48.5 44.1 42.8 38.6 
200,000 49.6 44.9 43.2 39.5 
Source: ZEW 
Table B-3: The family advantage: a family’s EATR divided by a single’s EATR, 
in % 
Disposable income in € France Germany UK USA 
40,000 72.1 44.1 81.3 59.4 
60,000 73.6 65.5 91.6 71.5 
80,000 76.6 68.9 94.8 79.1 
100,000 82.3 75.1 96.2 84.0 
120,000 83.9 80.5 97.0 85.4 
140,000 87.3 84.0 97.6 87.5 
160,000 89.6 86.4 97.9 89.6 
180,000 91.3 88.2 98.2 91.2 
200,000 92.4 89.6 98.4 91.7 
Source: ZEW 
Table B-4: The effective tax burden with variation of currency conversion rate, 
disposable income € 100,000, in % 
 France Germany UK USA 
Single     
PPP 49.0 48.9 40.9 39.0 
Average nominal exchange rates 49.0 48.9 40.8 38.5 
Source: ZEW 
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